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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE TRIAL OF AUTOMOBILE
DAMAGE SUITS
CHARLES A. LOWE*
Every lawsuit is in fact a logical syllogism. It has its
major premise, its minor premise and its conclusion. The
major premise of course is the law which is applicable to
the situation, while the minor premise is made up of those
particular facts which bring the matter before the court for
adjudication. The conclusion is the inference which must
necessarily follow and results from the application of the rule
of law constituting the major premise to the facts constitut-
ing the minor premise.
All too frequently, we find plaintiffs rushing into court
with a statement of particular facts without having first
taken any steps whatever to develop the major premise con-
trolling those facts. In other words, they have made no in-
vestigation whatever to determine the precise rule of law
which is applicable to their particular case. Before any
complaint is filed, there should be a close, intimate and
thorough investigation of the law and then the complaint
should be drafted so that the facts adduced in evidence will
come squarely within the rule of law which constitutes the
major premise. This is what is meant by the phrase which
is so often used to the effect that the pleader should adopt
some particular theory upon which he brings his case.
This brings us to a consideration of the first step in-
volved in the commencement of a lawsuit which is the prep-
aration of the complaint. The careful practitioner will usually
find that a great part of his work is done when he has made
a careful study of the law applicable to his particular sit-
uation and has carefully drafted his complaint to call those
rules into play.
However, there are many things which can be done
which will have a tendency to simplify the complaint and, at
the same time, operate to the benefit of the plaintiff, in the
subsequent steps of the action.
* An address by the Honorable Charles A. Lowe of the Lawrenceburg,
Indiana, Bar before the Legal Institute sponsored by the Indiana
State Bar Association at the Claypool Hotel, Indianapolis, Indiana,
on January 24, 1941.
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Our Supreme Court on September 2, 1940, adopted
certain rules of practice for the nisi prius courts. I refer
particularly to rule 1-2 with reference to the stating of the
claim or defense. This rule provides that in all proceedings,
except criminal cases, the averments of claim or defense, shall
be stated in separate rhetorical paragraphs numbered con-
secutively so that the contents of each rhetorical paragraph
shall be limited so far as practicable, to the statement of a
single set of related circumstances.
This rule, I believe, is a good one, and careful attention
to its provisions, and a diligent effort to comply therewith,
will result in benefit to the practicing lawyer. In the first
place, it will tend to produce clear thinking and a concise
statement of the cause of action in an orderly and succint
manner. This alone would be accomplishment enough, but I
believe also, that it will prove of more practical benefit to the
plaintiff. I make this statement on account of the pro-
visions of Rule 1-3 which was adopted by the Supreme Court
at the same time. This particular rule abolishes the general
denial, as it was known and used in this State, and substitutes
therefor, an answer or other pleading specifically admitting
or denying the facts stated in each rhetorical paragraph. The
rule further states that the pleader may admit or deny a part
of a rhetorical paragraph, in which event he shall specify the
allegations which he admits and those which he denies.
Already we are meeting with considerable difficulty in
the carrying out of this rule and the tendency is fast develop-
ing to admit only those rhetorical paragraphs which can be
safely admitted in toto and to deny the whole of a rhetorical
paragraph which the pleader cannot admit as a whole. In
view of such tendency, it should be the effort of the pleader
in the drafting of his initial pleading, to subdivide the facts
into rhetorical paragraphs which are capable of being ad-
mitted or denied as a whole. I have in mind, for example,
the ordinary complaint in an automobile damage suit, in
which there should be a rhetorical paragraph dealing only
with the capacity of the plaintiff to sue; another rhetorical
paragraph setting up the corporate existence of the defend-
ant, if it is a corporation; a third setting out briefly and
concisely, the inducing facts leading up to the accident, such
as the existence of certain public highways, the width, nature
of surface and other details having to do with the physical
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setting; another rhetorical paragraph might contain the al-
legations, if necessary, with reference to agency; then still
another giving the bare facts of the accident. These could
be followed by a paragraph setting out the acts which are
claimed to have been negligently done and ending with a
paragraph containing the allegations of damage. When the
plaintiff has prepared and filed a complaint in this manner,
it may well be that the answer will admit all of the clauses
with the exception of those dealing with the allegations of
negligence and damage. Usually those are the only facts in
dispute.
After having thus carefully drafted his complaint, the
plaintiff should then insist upon specific denials in accordance
with Rule 1-3 ,with the idea in mind of narrowing the issues
as much as possbile by securing admissions from the de-
fendant of all the facts not really in dispute.
Guest Law
Prior to the Act of 1929, one riding as a guest passenger
in the automobile of his host, might sue the host for injuries
negligently inflicted and the rights of the host and the guest
were adjudicated within the field of ordinary negligence.
There were few, if any limitations upon such right. One
recognized in Indiana and in many other states was that a
wife could not sue her husband for personal inuries caused
by his negligence. Biickenstaff v. Blickenstaff (1929) 89
Ind. App. 529. But even this limitation did not prevail
in states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
The spectacle of a mother suing a son or a daughter
suing a mother or father and, in the states mentioned, hus-
band or wife suing each other for damages presented such
a revolting scene that it was only a question of time until
some change in the system would be brought about, either
by the trend of court decisions or by the positive enactment of
statute. Impetus was added to this movement by the realiza-
tion that such actions were almost uniformly collusive for
the purpose of collecting damages from an insurance company
involved in the action upon the part of the defendant.
A third situation giving rise to such statutes was the in-
nate and inherent feeling that it was unjust to permit the
benefactor of a person taking a free ride to be penalized by
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his guest passenger for an act of kindness, hospitality or
sociability for which the benefactor received no reward or
benefit whatever.
The result was the passage of Guest Statutes in numerous
states and in Indiana, in 1929, as I have stated.
The original Statute in Indiana provided two cases in
which liability might be asserted by a guest passenger against
the host. (1) where the accident was intentional upon the
part of the host; (2) where the accident was caused by his
reckless disregard of the rights of others. The cases arising
under the first branch of the Statute, that is, the intentional
accident portion thereof, were very few, but numerous actions
arose involving the second ground, that is, "reckless disregard
of the rights of others." This phrase was construed in the
case of Coconower v. Stoddard, 96 Ind. App. 287, where the
court defined "reckless disregard of the rights of others,"
as being a situation where the defendant,
"Voluntarily does an improper or wrongful act, or with
knowledge of existing conditions, voluntarily refrains from
doing a proper or prudent act under circumstances when his
action or his failure to act evinces an entire abandonment of
any care, and a heedless indifference to results which may
follow and he reckless3 takes the chance of an accident hap-
pening, without intent that any occur."
Under this Statute, it was held by the courts that some-
thing more was required to make a case involving "reckless
disregard of the rights of others," than "mere" negligence
or "simple" negligence, but the courts were rather indefinite
about what that something more had to be; as a result, prac-
tically all of the cases were submitted to a jury upon the
question of fact whether the particular conduct involved
amount to "reckless disregard of the rights of others." This
situation was very favorable to the plaintiff, much more so
than in some other states like Michigan, for example, where
the rule of gross negligence prevailed and where the courts
frequently decided, as a matter of law, what facts did and
what facts did not constitute gross neglegence.
The amendment of 1937 to the Guest Statute entirely
eliminated the feature involving, "reckless disregard of the
rights of others," so that the Statute now gives a right of
action in favor of the guest passenger against his host for
wanton or willful misconduct of the operator, owner, or
person responsible for the operation of the automobile.
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There has been considerable hazy thinking in connection
with the application of this Guest Statute. It should be borne
clearly in mind that there are three situations in which a
passenger injured while being transported in a motor vehicle
of another, may avoid the limitation of the Guest Statute.
These three conditions are as follows:
1. That he is not a guest.
2. That he is being transported for payment.
3. That the injuries were caused by the willful or wan-
ton misconduct of the operator.
If any one of these conditions exist, the Statute will not
operate to deny a recovery. The third condition, in effect,
is a fulfillment of the conditions of the Guest Statute. The
first two render the Statute inapplicable and the case is
thrown back within the field of general negligence.
Voelld v. Latin (1938 Ohio App.)
58 Ohio App. 245,
16 N. E. (2d) 519.
In considering the Guest Statute as it exists at present
in the State of Indiana, it may be useful to consider certain
Ohio cases for the reason that the Ohio Statute and the pres-
ent Indiana Statute, are identical.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined wanton mis-
conduct in the following language:
"Wanton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a dis-
position to perversity, and it must be under such surround-
ing circumstances and existing conditions that the party
doing the act or failing to act, must be conscious, from his
knowledge of such surrounding circumstances and existing
conditions that his conduct will, in all common probability,
result in injury."
Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett
130 0. S. 567,
200 N. E. 843
This would seem to be about as clear a statement of the
matter as could be made.
It might be of benefit to illustrate further, the two
situations in which the Guest Statute is not applicable at all;
that is (1) where the passenger is not a guest and (2) where
he is a pay passenger. Two Ohio cases clearly illustrate the
distinction. The first is that of Bailey v. Neale, (1939), 63
Ohio App. 62; 3 N. E. (2d) 702. In that case, Bailey was a
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law teacher in connection with the Akron Law School, of
which the defendant, Neale, was the sole owner. In order
to meet certain requirements imposed upon his law school,
he and the plaintiff, Bailey, were engaged in making a trip
to Cleveland, for the purpose of discussing a similar situation
with the officials of another law school. While returning
home, Neale drove the car into a bridge-head and Bailey was
injured. It appeared that Bailey was going along solely
for the benefit of the defendant Neale. It was true that there
was a rather indefinite and intangible benefit accruing to
Bailey in connection with the trip in that, he might retain
his teaching position through a continuance of operation of
the law school. The court, however, held that the Guest
Statute was not applicable and that Bailey was not a guest
and upheld the trial court in applying the rule of "simple"
negligence to the case. They applied the following rule for
the purpose of testing whether a passenger was a guest or
otherwise.
"A guest withing the meaning of the Guest Law, is one who
is invited either directly or by implication to enjoy the hos-
pitality of the driver of an automobile, who accepts such hos-
pitality, and who takes a ride either for his own pleasure or
on his own business without making any return to or con-
ferring any benefit upon the driver of the automobile other
than the mere pleasure of his company."
While this rule has been criticized (McCann v. Hoffman,
9 Cal. (2d) 279, 70 Pac. (2d) 909), it has been adhered to
by the courts of Ohio so that we may say that under a Statute
precisely similar to ours, the courts have laid down the test
as being whether there is a definite tangible benefit to the
operator of the automobile. This rule of a definite tangible
benefit has also been adopted in Massachusetts, with the
limitation that the benefit must be a pecuniary benefit to
the driver or operator of the automobile.
Foley v. McDonald, 283 Mass. 96,
185 N. E. 926.
Woods v. Woods, 295 Mass. 238.
3 N. E .(2d) 837.
Time will not permit the discussion of all of the various
rules of law arising under the Guest Statute. It has been
held universally, that contributory negligence under such
Statutes, is not a defense but there has been a pronounced
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disposition upon the courts to allow the defense of assumption
of risk under the maxim "volenti non fit injuria."
An illustrative case is that of Munson v. Rupker (1925),
96 Ind. App. 15. This case, of course, was decided prior to the
Guest Statute and involved the question of what rule of
law to apply to an accident involving injury to a guest-pas-
senger, the conclusion finally being that the rule of reasonable
care should apply to such a situation. The court, however,
on page 30, said:
"He who enters an automobile to take a ride with the owner
also takes the automobile and the driver as he finds them."
Here, we have the germ of the rule of the defense known
as, "Assumption of Risk." It may be sufficient upon this sub-
ject to quote the language of some of the states:
Arkansas:
"The guest takes the automobile and the driver as he
finds them."
Howe v. Little (1931) 182 Ark. 1083, 34 S. W. (2d) 218.
In California, where a girl was permitted to ride on a
truck with her legs dangling from the truck bed, by reason of
which she was bounced off, the court said:
"If, during the usual and ordinary movements of the
truck on which she was riding, the plaintiff, solely by reason
of the position she had taken, had been bounced off the truck,
she probably would have had no remedy against the defend-
ant for the very good reason that in that case, she would
have to attribute her injury solely to her own voluntary con-
duct. That would be one of the risks ordinarily incident to
plaintiff's position on the truck."
Gornstein v. Priver, (1923) 64 Cal. App. 249, 221 Pac. 396.
In North Dakota, in a case involving skidding on an icy
road, the court said:
"A guest in an automobile takes the automobile as is."
and in an instruction, the court told the jury,
"The plaintiff assumed the risk of the car skidding and
he cannot recover unless he has shown you that the skidding
and overturning was proximately caused by the defendants
negligence."
Eddy v. Wells (1930) 59 N. D. 663, 231 N. W. 785.
The doctrine seems also to obtain in the Federal Courts.
Liggett and Myers Tobaccc Company v. DeParcq, 66
Fed (2d) 678.
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That case involved an accident caused by driving over
a ridge of gravel, with the resultant collapse of a wheel. The
court said:
"When the guest enters the car, he accepts it in the
existing condition, except as to latent defects known to the
driver, and he likewise accepts the driver with his habits
of driving so far as known to him, with such skill ....
as he actually possesses."
It will thus be seen that there is room for the defense
of assumption of risk and the plaintiff should take this mat-
ter into consideration in the bringing of his action.
I have said before that it is the universal holding that
contributory negligence is not a defense under the Guest
Statute. There is, however, another question often arising
which is whether willful or wanton misconduct upon the part
of the plaintiff himself, that is the precise kind of conduct
which is alleged against the defendant, will constitute a
defense.
It has been held by a number of courts that where the
action is founded upon willful or wanton misconduct, that
while contributory negligence is not a defense, nevertheless,
willful or wanton misconduct upon the part of the plaintiff,
will bar a recovery if a proximate cause of the accident. This
is illustrated by the case of
Hinkle v. Minn. etc., Railway Co., (1925) (Minn.) 202
N. W. 340,
41 A. L. R. 1377.
In that case, the court gave the following explanation
of the matter:
"One is liable for negligence only when such negligence
is the proximate cause of the injury. When a defendant is
charged with ordinary negligence, contributory negligence is
a good defense. Why? The answer is founded in proximate
cause. In the absence of the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, they are equally to blame. When two persons are
equally at fault in producing the injury, the law leaves them
where it finds them. Contributory negligence is not a de-
fense to wanton and willful negligence for the very simple
reason that the parties are not equally delinquent in the viola-
tion of duty. In such case, the negligence of the defendant
is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, while his negli-
gence is not more than a remote cause.
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The theory of these variations of negligence leads to
but one logical conclusion and that is that the same basic
reason which causes contributory negligence to prevent a re-
covery in an action sounding in ordinary negligence, also pre-
vents a recovery by one who is guilty of willful and wanton
negligence. Such negligence is just as efficient to offset the
defendant's negligence of the same character as contributory
negligence offsets ordinary negligence. There can be no more
comparative wantonness than there can be comparative neg-
ligence. When both parties are guilty of such negligence
neither can be selected as that which is the proximate cause
and hence the law must leave both where it finds them. The
conclusion is inevitable even though its application be fraught
with difficulties."
This rule is supported in Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, California and Kansas.
In the case of Schneider v. Brecht, (1935) 6 Cal. App.
(2d) 379, the court held that while contributory negligence
was not a defense under the Guest Statute, that participation
in the drinking party by the plaintiff amounted to misconduct
equal to that of the defendant and the court concluded that
if the defendant was guilty of willfulness, the plaintiff was
likewise guilty of willfulness.
In the case of Koster v. Matson, (1934) 139 Kan. 124,
30 Pac. (2d) 107,
The court said:
"The host provides and drives the car, and the guest
provides the liquor; or the guest urges the host to 'step on it.'
The inevitable occurs. The guest may not recover because
he was a participant in creation of the peril, and this is true
in case of willful, reckless, or wanton misconduct."
I appreciate that the matter of defenses is one that
should be more properly discussed by the speaker of the
afternoon when he comes to speak to the subject-matter un-
der discussion from the standpoint of the defendant but it is
always important for the plaintiff to know what defenses
may be and may not be interposed to his action and for that
reason, I have discussed it here.
Service On Defendant
Ordinarily no question will arise in connection with the
service of summons upon resident defendants but sometimes
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a serious problem is presented with reference to service upon
non-resident defendants. Of course provision is now made by
Section 47-1043, providing that the operation of an automo-
bile by a non-resident within the boundaries of the State of
Indiana, shall automatically operate as an appointment of the
Chief Administrative Officer of the Department of Treasury
as the agent for service of process. These Statutes have been
held constitutional and no doubt longer remains about their
validity and effectiveness.
There is however, one recent provision of the Indiana
Statutes which may affect the service of summons upon for-
eign corporations. I refer particularly to Chapter 60 Section
1 of the Acts of 1939 (Burns Supplement 25-316). This
Statute deals with service of process on corporations not ad-
mitted to do business in Indiana and provides a method for
obtaining service upon foreign corporations by serving the
Secretary of State, very similar to the one above mentioned.
The existence of this Act should be borne in mind because
by its terms, it is broad enough to include accidents caused
by automobiles used in connection with work done by a for-
eign corporation within the State of Indiana.
Some states have gone to extreme lengths in connection
with this matter of insuring to residents, the opportunity of
bringing their actions in the courts of their own state. For
example, Wisconsin permits the action to be brought against
the insurance company alone, without joining the insured
and this often permits the action to be brought in the court
of the county wherein the plaintiff resides without even at-
tempting to make use of the Statutes providing for service
upon the Secretary of State or other administrative officer.
Ordinarily however, no difficulty is experienced in the
matter of service and the Statutes of Indiana are ample to
meet almost any situation which can arise.
Answer
After having carefully prepared the complaint and hav-
ing seen to it that his complaint is divided into rhetorical
paragraphs, the plaintiff should then insist upon the defend-
ant complying with the rule himself by denying or admitting
each specific allegation of the complaint, all with the idea of




It has always been the law of Indiana and of the other
states, that if the plaintiff desired to rely upon the law of a
foreign state, that he must plead such law as a fact. In
other words, he must treat the law of a foreign jurisdiction
not as a part of his major premise but as a part of his minor
premise. However, in 1937, the Legislature adopted what is
known as the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.
The provisions of this Act should be carefully studied and
the proper proceedings taken to take advantage of the Act
if the law of the foreign jurisdiction is not set out in the
complaint. My own recommendation is that wherever the
law of a sister jurisdiction is to be relied upon, that the law
be pleaded in the same manner as heretofore. This is the
safe and sure way. It does not in any way prevent the use
of the Uniform Act but merely puts the plaintiff in position
where he may make use of both methods or either at his
option. It is to be noted however, that Section 4 of the Act
(Burns Supplement Section 2-4804) provides that before
the party shall offer evidence of the law of another jurisdic-
tion or ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable
notice should be given to the adverse party, either in the
pleadings or otherwise. Of course, if the matter is not set
out in the pleadings, then a separate notice should be given
to the opposite side before the trial, specifically advising
such party of the intention to offer evidence as to the law
of the foreign jurisdiction, and the same kind of notice should
be given if the court is to be asked to take judicial notice of
such law. It seems to me, that the safest method is to plead
the foreign law in the complaint. This takes the place of any
notice and the plaintiff is then in a position to ask the court
to take judicial notice of the law of the foreign state or to
make proof of it, if he so desires, without asking the court to
take judicial notice of it.
Pre-Trial Procedure
We have fairly well covered the difficulties most likely
to arise prior to trial. It is to be expected that the plaintiff's
pleading will have to run the gamut of the usual attacks by
motions to strike out, to make definite and certain, of de-
murrer, but having at last, arrived at the point where the
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case has been put at issue, the plainiff may then give con-
sideration to the matter of proving his case. Pre-trial pro-
cedure is new in Indiana, although it has been in use in some
of the larger cities in the country for sometime with very
favorable results. It has been adopted as a part of the Uni-
form Federal Rules of Procedure.
I think it is possible for the plaintiff to make use of
this procedure to his advantage in eliminating considerable
unnecessary evidence. It has always seemed to me that it is
a waste of time, energy and effort, to start at the very be-
ginning of a lawsuit and prove each and every fact alleged
in the complaint with meticulous care when, in reality, there
were only one or two questions at issue between the parties.
Pre-trial procedure contemplates frank and open admissions
by the palties so that the issue will be narrowed down to
the real dispute in existence between them. The plaintiff
might well ask for a pre-trial hearing in an automobile dam-
age suit, with the idea of securing admissions upon considera-
tions as follows:
1. Corporate capacity of the defendant, if involved in
the action.
2. Capacity of the plaintiff to sue, such as his trust
capacity or the fact that he is an administrator, etc.
3. Ownership or possession of the automobiles involved.
4. Agency of the driver. This fact is not often in
issue and may usually be admitted. However there
are some cases in which agency becomes one of the
major, if not the all important, issue of the ease.
5. Admissions as to correctness of plats, photographs,
etc.
6. Agreements as to measurements, distances and
physical surroundings.
7. Undisputed facts such as the place of the occurrence
of the accident or the occurrence of the accident
itself.
8. The kind and make of the automobiles involved and
by whom operated.
9. The admission of the fact of death, if such has
resulted.
10. The age of the decedent, if such is involved.
11. The expectancy of life.
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I mention all of these not as attempting to give a com-
plete list but merely for the purpose of pointing out some of
the things which may be admitted in a lawsuit without in
any way affecting the litigation of the vital questions in con-
troversy.
Empaneling the Jury
Probably more difficulty arises in connection with the
empaneling of the jury in automobile cases than in any
other class of cases. This usually comes about by reason of
the fact that the plaintiff makes inquiry of the individual
members of the jury, whether they are connected in any way
with an insurance company which is defending the action.
Of course in those states such as Wisconsin, Rhode
Island, Louisiana, and Washington, which permit a joinder
of the insurance carrier, there is no incentive upon the part
of the plaintiff to apprise the jury of the fact of insurance
by making appropriate inquiries upon the voir dire examina-
tion. But in states such as Indiana, where the plaintiff has
no right to apprise the jury directly of the fact of insurance,
it is customary for the plaintiff to examine each individual
juror upon his voir dire examination as to his connection with
any liability or casualty insurance company, conducting the
defense of the action. This is customarily done by asking
each individual juror whether he is an agent, policy holder,
officer, director, stockholder or connected in any other man-
ner, with the particular insurance company concerned. Our
courts permit this action upon the theory that the plaintiff
has the right to have this information for the purpose of
intelligently exercising a peremptory challenge.
Of course after each of the twelve men in the jury box
have been questioned in this manner, they either know of the
fact of insurance or they are excessively dumb and the ap-
prising of the jury of the existence of insurance is usually
one of the main objects of the question. So far as I know,
the Indiana courts have never passed upon the question of
the right of the plaintiff to challenge for cause, where the
juror upon his voir dire examination answers that he is a
policy holder in the insurance company concerned, but states
that he is wholly disinterested. This precise question is now
pending before the Appellate Court and it would be improper
for me to discuss it here.
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It might be well however, for us to observe the rule
of practice in our sister state of Ohio. Formerly they would
not permit the inquiry at all but now the practice is to permit
the plaintiff to make inquiry of the prospective juror, whether
he is connected in any way with any casualty or liability
insurance company; if he answers that he is, the plaintiff
may then follow the matter up and make inquiry, further,
whether he is connected with the particular insurance com-
pany concerned in the action.
Personally, I think this is an excellent practice. It serves
to protect the defendant to a certain extent; it prevents the
plaintiff from making the inquiry as a mere subterfuge and
as a means of conveying information to the jury that such
insurance exists and, upon the other hand, it fully protects
the plaintiff in all of the rights to which he is entitled under
the law. The practice, I repeat, is a good one and might well
commend itself to the courts of Indiana.
An unusual practice in this regard exists in the State
of Minnesota. In that State, it is not proper to join the
insurance carrier as a party defendant but it is possible for
the plaintiff's attorney, in the presence of the jury, to re-
quest the defendant's counsel to state whether or not an in-
surance company is conducting the defense and, if the an-
swer is in the affirmative, they may ask the name of the
insurance company. The trial judge usually requires the
answers to be given. Of course such a practice as this is no
better than having the insurance company joined as a party
defendant.
All told, our practice in Indiana, conforms very closely
to the practice in the majority of the other states and a
close supervision of the empaneling of the jury by the trial
court and the exercise of those ample powers, with which
it is vested, will usually secure to the plaintiff, all that he is
entitled to in this phase of the action, while at the same time,
protecting the defendant against improper and prejudicial
action which will prevent a fair trial of the case.
Tendering Instructions
The new rules of practice make no change in the method
of tendering instructions to the court. The rule has to do
entirely with the method of taking exceptions thereto. The
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plaintiff of course, should tender instructions, not with the
idea, as is often done by the defendant, for the purpose of
getting error into the record, but for the purpose of present-
ing his own theory of the action to the court. The instruc-
tions should be prepared, therefore, as heretofore, that is,
they should be in writing, separately numbered and each one
confined as closely as practicable to one specific phase of
the case.
It should be borne in mind that it is no longer necessary,
under the rule adopted by the Supreme Court, for either party
to take exceptions to the refusal to give instructions. Ex-
ceptions are automatically given by the rule whenever an
instruction is refused. It is only when instructions are given
by the court, that objections must be made thereto. As a
result, the following practice is recommended:
1. The plaintiff should file specific written objections
to each instruction which is given by the court, whether
given by the court of its own motion or tendered by the op-
posite party.
2. The alternative method of making objection is for
the party to state his specific objections to each instruction
out of the presence of the jury. Already the practice has
been indulged in by some of the courts of Indiana, to permit
the parties to state their specific objections to each instruc-
tion given by the court out of the presence of the court and
the other party. This, in my opinion, is not the theory of the
rule. It clearly contemplates that the objections of each party
should be submitted to the court in the presence of the other
party in order that the court may pass upon them and deter-
mine whether or not such objections are allowed or overruled.
This practice is undoubtedly the outgrowth of the former
method of taking exceptions to the oral charge of the judge
in the Federal Court. This had to be done in the presence
of the court and jury and often resulted in an embarrassing
situation arising for the counsel making the objection. The
new rules of Federal Procedure now provide that, upon re-
quest, the jury shall be excluded and the objections may be
made to the Judge out of the presence of the jury. Clearly
however, the Federal practice still contemplates that the ob-
jections shall be made to the court and this is the usual prac-
tice. I believe that it was the intention of our Supreme Court,
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to adopt this system of making objections and it was never
the intention of the Supreme Court in making this rule, to
permit each side to dictate sub rosa, his objections to the
official reporter and thus keep them secret both from the
opposite party and the court. Such practice should not be
commended or indulged in and I sincerely hope that it does
not prevail hereafter to any great extent in this jurisdiction.
Motions for New Trial
Under the practice in Indiana, the motion for new trial
must specifically state the grounds of objection. This rule
is undoubtedly the outgrowth of a desire to prevent questions
being raised in the Court of Appeal, which were not present-
ed to the trial court. I think the motive behind the rule is
a very worthy one but as a matter of practice, it tends to
encumber the record without accomplishing any real purpose.
For example, in Ohio, they get along about as well as we do.
Their skies are just as sunny; their lawsuits are heard and
determined in less time than with us; their citizens are just
as prosperous and their economic and social status is just as
high as ours. Yet, it has always been the practice in Ohio,
that the motion for new trial can be filed setting out only the
statutory grounds, and it must be filed within four days after
verdict. They also have the rule that specific objections to
evidence need not be made. All that is required is that there
be an objection and that objection be overruled and exception
taken. Of course with us, exceptions are no longer necessary.
It occurs to me that the time required by our court pro-
ceedings, might well be cut down. We continually complain
of the fact that the jurisdiction of the courts is being whit-
tled away by the various administrative bodies but yet we
insist upon the courts lumbering along their unwieldly way,
taking months and years to decide a matter, which an ad-
ministrative body disposes of in a few days or a few weeks at
most, and then we quarrel with the administrative bodies
and complain of their usurping the province of the courts and
making inroads upon the prerogatives of the legal profession.
Much of this can be avoided if the lawyer would develop the
proper attitude toward the case which he is handling. He
should assume the attitude that the case is not his case.
He is merely trying it for his client. He has no mandate
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to win the case for his client. His client may be wrong. His
only mandate and full duty is to see that the facts of his
client's case are fairly, honestly and competently presented
to the court. When he has done this, he has done his entire
duty as a lawyer. Why should he object to the rules of the
game being changed so that the disposition of causes may be
speeded up? A good player can play the game under the
same rules that are applicable to the other fellow and he
should be willing to do so. He has no right to have special
rules made for the benefit of him or his client.
What I have said with reference to the prompt and ef-
ficient trial of lawsuits is applicable to automobile cases but
is alike applicable to other cases. It is true today, as it has
been in all ages, that "justice delayed is usually justice de-
nied."
